Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
A lthough there has been a recent policy focus on ending marriage penalties in the income tax system, the tax system is just one of many government policies that is not marriage neutral. For example, a large literature focuses on the marriage disincentives in traditional welfare programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), or as it is now known, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. Concerns over how marriage disincentives might affect the well-being and development of children motivate this literature. Despite concerns regarding the well-being of children, researchers virtually ignore marriage penalties in the Social Security program that provides benefi ts to families with widow(er)s caring for minor or disabled children. 1 In the event of the death of a covered worker, Social Security pays these benefi ts to each minor or disabled child and to the worker's widow(er) provided a child of the worker is in his or her care. Although remarriage has no effect on a child's eligibility for benefi ts, the benefi t going directly to the widow(er) terminates if he or she remarries. Using administrative data, this paper is the fi rst to characterize the distribution of these penalties.
The child-in-care program affects a sizeable number of survivors. At the start of 2001, there were 240,000 persons entitled to child-in-care widow(er) benefi ts, with over 400,000 children in their care. Payments to these families totaled four billion dollars, with $1.3 billion distributed to widow(er)s and $2.7 billion for their children.
2 There is a substantial amount of turnover in the entitled population, such that during the fi ve-year period 1996 through 2000, about 500,000 widow(er)s were entitled at some point to benefi ts on the accounts of deceased workers. These 500,000 widow(er)s cared for a substantial number of children--more than a million children had established entitlement to benefi ts on these accounts by the end of 2000.
3
Unlike private insurance, social insurance systems such as the U.S. Social Security program often have provisions that limit or stop payments based on a benefi ciary's ability to support himself or herself. Widow(er)s who remarry presumably receive economic support from their new spouses and are in less need of support from a public program. In this regard, the termination provision is similar to another feature of Social Security, namely, the earnings test. Widow(er)s (and other benefi ciaries) who are under the full retirement age and who earn above exempt amounts specifi ed in the law have some or all of their Social Security benefi ts stopped. 4 Provisions such as the termination rule and the earnings test help ensure a well-targeted Social Security program, but they may have the unintended consequence of distorting marriage and work decisions. 5 In addition, this program design, which uses legal marital status as the measure of "need of support," raises horizontal equity issues. In particular, unmarried, cohabiting couples are eligible for child-in-care widow(er) benefi ts, while otherwise similar, yet legally married, couples are not. With the rising prevalence of unmarried cohabitation, this possibility is increasingly likely. 6 In an effort to aid policymakers in assessing the trade-offs between a welltargeted program and marriage incentives, we measure the size of marriage penalties in the child-in-care program. Our comparison of these results with studies from other literatures suggests the child-in-care penalties are large Weaver, 2004) . They consider the remarriage penalty facing aged (not child-in-care) widows whose deceased spouses worked in Social Security covered employment. The authors fi nd that the 1979 law that reduced the penalty for remarriage over age 60 resulted in more widows over age 60 marrying and that marriage rates among widows drop immediately prior to age 60 and increase at age 60. 2 While these are small numbers in the context of the overall Social Security program, which paid $432 billion to 46 million benefi ciaries in 2001, they are not trivial when compared to TANF, a large transfer program for families with children. Cash payments under TANF were about $14.5 billion in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002) . 3 These statistics are based on weighted samples from administrative records maintained by the Social Security Administration. 4 The full retirement age of Social Security varies by birth cohort. U.S. Social Security Administration (2001a , 2001b contain information on this provision and on other program rules. 5 See Leonesio (1993) and Friedberg (2000) for evidence on the incentive effects of the earnings test. 6 There are some important equity issues not addressed by our research. For example, even though the benefi t is based on having the child of the deceased worker in care, only the widow(er) of the worker is eligible. In some cases following a worker's death, it will be another relative who will care for the child. If the caregiver is older (for example, a grandmother), this equity issue may be of less concern because the older caregiver might already qualify for Social Security.
enough to affect marriage decisions. We also offer cost estimates for the complete repeal of the termination rule (including marriages that have already occurred) and for a less costly prospective repeal of the termination provision. Overall, our work addresses the incentive effects of the termination provision and the costs associated with its repeal.
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An interesting and recent development in the policy discussions over government programs and marriage involves the re-authorization of the TANF program. The Bush Administration and many members of Congress argued that the government should take an active role in informing welfare recipients about the benefits of marriage, including public education campaigns (U.S. Congress, 2002a) . The idea of the government providing information to program benefi ciaries about the effects of marriage is an interesting one in the case of the child-in-care program. Our discussion of how marriage penalties arise in the Social Security program suggests that many widow(er)s may perceive much larger penalties than actually exist. In fact, because of complex family maximum provisions in the Social Security law (which may not be well understood), a substantial portion of persons who receive widow(er) benefi ts actually face no penalty (at the family level) but may believe that they do. We offer some practical suggestions on how the Social Security Administration (SSA) can better inform its benefi ciaries about actual penalties-an approach that entails relatively little cost but that may promote marriage.
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS: MARRIAGE PENALTIES IN THE CHILD-IN-CARE PROGRAM
Social Security calculates benefi ts based on primary insurance amounts (PIAs)-a fi gure based on a worker's average lifetime monthly earnings in Social Security covered employment. A person's PIA increases with earnings, but the PIA formula favors low earners. A widow(er) caring for a deceased worker's child who is under age 16 or disabled is eligible for a monthly benefi t potentially equal to 75 percent of the deceased worker's PIA. Each child who is under age 18, disabled, or aged 18 to 19 and attending high school is also eligible for a benefit potentially equal to 75 percent of PIA. The widow(er)'s eligibility ends when he or she remarries or when the youngest child reaches age 16, whichever comes fi rst. 8 However, the children's benefi ts continue as long as they are categorically eligible.
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Although each survivor is potentially eligible for 75 percent of PIA, two provisions of Social Security-the family maximum and the earnings test-can reduce this amount. Thus, the monthly marriage penalty faced by a child-in-care widow(er) is not necessarily equal to 75 percent of the PIA.
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The family maximum of Social Security limits the total amount that can be paid on a given worker's record and is a function of the worker's PIA. To illustrate this provision, consider a worker who died in 2001. Monthly family benefi ts to the widow(er) and children in that year cannot exceed: 7 We do not address the overall treatment of marriage by the Social Security program. As a whole, Social Security likely subsidizes marriage because several types of benefi ts are based on marriage (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2001a). 8 In the large majority of cases, benefi ts are terminated due to child's age, not remarriage of the widow(er). In 2000, 78 percent of widow(er) benefi t terminations were due to the youngest child reaching age 16 (based on authors' tabulations from SSA administrative records). 9 Social Security eligibility rules have changed over time. Prior to legislation in 1981, child benefi ts could be paid to full-time college students and a widow(er) was considered to have a child in his or her care until the child reached age 18 (not the current age 16). 10 Surviving divorced spouses are also eligible for child-in-care benefi ts. Throughout the paper, the term widow(er) is meant to include surviving divorced spouses. Also, a child-in-care widow(er) benefi t terminates upon marriage, but it can be restored if the marriage ends. Social Security determines the initial maximum in the year the worker dies or the year the worker is fi rst eligible for Social Security benefi ts (i.e., is age 62 or disabled), which ever is earlier. From the date it is determined, Social Security annually adjusts the maximum and the PIA for infl ation. The dollar bend points of the formula used to determine the initial family maximum adjust each year for wage growth in the economy. Figure 1 , based on the formula above, shows the relationship between the PIA and the family maximum (FMAX). The family maximum is never below 150 percent of the PIA and is never above 187.5 percent of PIA. 11 The formula for the maximum is somewhat unusual, partly because it is more restrictive for low PIA families. Because the PIA formula gives greater weight to low earnings, policymakers were apparently concerned that -unless the family maximum was tighter for these families-total benefi ts paid on the account would exceed (or more than replace) the worker's earnings prior to death.
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To see how the family maximum affects marriage penalties, consider a family of three (a widow(er) and two children) whose maximum is 187.5 percent of the PIA. Although each family member's original benefi t amount is 75 percent of PIA, the family maximum will only allow each member to be paid 62.5 percent of PIA (for a total of 187.5 percent). If the widow(er) remarries, his or her benefi t stops but the two children then receive their full original benefi t amounts of 75 percent of PIA. The family's total benefi t following remarriage would be 150 percent of PIA. The actual monthly marriage penalty to the family, therefore, is 37.5 (i.e., 187.5 -150) percent of PIA. bend point by the same factor, it will always be the case that the family maximum ranges from 150 percent of PIA to about 187.5 percent of PIA. Note that, in Figure 1 , we allow the PIA to range from $0 to $2,000; such a range likely includes all possible PIA values for workers who died in 2001 (see Table 2 .A26 in U.S. Social Security Administration (2001a) for the most recent information on PIA values of maximum earners). 12 The current family maximum formula is based on the 1977 Amendments to the Social Security Act. See Ball (1978) for a fuller discussion of the rationale behind the family maximum formula.
We calculate the actual penalty at the family level for two reasons. First, the widow(er) likely controls the family's Social Security payments regardless of whether he or she receives a benefi t himself or herself. Generally, the widow(er) would be appointed by SSA as the representative payee for the children (see U.S. Social Security Administration (2003) for SSA's payee policies). As the payee, the widow(er) would receive the checks for the children or manage their bank accounts (in the case of direct deposit). Second, measures of economic well-being, such as the U.S. poverty measure, are typically based on family income.
In general, we write the actual monthly marriage penalty as the difference between the family benefits when the widow(er) and the children are eligible, B U , and the family benefi ts when only the children are eligible, B M :
where N denotes the number of children and FMAX is the family maximum that applies. 13 The formula indicates that, in addition to PIA, the number of children present is a major determinant of the penalty size.
14 Figure 2 depicts this relationship in monthly dollars for 2001.
13 N represents the total number of children being paid on a deceased worker's account. In complicated family situations, not all of the children on the account will be cared for by the widow(er). For example, a worker may have left surviving children with two different mothers. We do not believe this is common, partly because so few of these deceased workers (who typically died at relatively young ages) appear to have been married more than once. SSA data indicate that in only two percent of child-in-care cases are there two or more adults being paid on a single deceased worker's account (e.g., a widow and a surviving divorced wife). We discuss how we handle that small subset of cases in the empirical section, but, due to limitations of our data extract, we assume all children on the account are in the widow(er)'s care and that, together, they form a family that shares resources. 14 Exceptions in the law allow child-in-care survivors to marry other child-in-care survivors (or certain other Social Security benefi caries) and still retain benefi ts. We assume throughout that this does not occur.
Figure 2. Actual Marriage Penalties
When only one child is present, B U is 150 percent of PIA and B M is 75 percent of PIA.
Since the family maximum, by law, is never below 150 percent of PIA, it is not a factor in the penalty calculation in this case, and, consequently, the monthly penalty is always 75 percent of PIA. When three or more children are present, the family maximum binds regardless of whether the widow(er) receives benefits, that is, B U and B M both equal the family maximum. Therefore, the penalty is always zero when three or more children are present. When two children are present, the penalty depends on the PIA. One interesting result in the case of two children is that if the PIA is low (i.e., below the fi rst bend point in the family maximum formula), the marriage penalty is zero because, whether the widow(er) is eligible or not, the family benefi t will be 150 percent of PIA. In general, the family maximum provisions cause the dollar value of the monthly marriage penalty to be negatively related to the number of children and positively related to the size of the PIA. As noted above, the earnings test of Social Security also affects the marriage penalty a widow(er) faces. In 2001 the earnings test requires that, for each two dollars of annual earnings above $10,680, a widow(er) loses one dollar in his or her Social Security benefit (the $10,680 fi gure is referred to as the exempt amount and is adjusted annually by SSA based on wage growth in the economy). To see how the earnings test affects marriage penalties, consider a specifi c example: a family composed of a widow(er) and two children where the PIA is $1,034 and the family maximum is $1,938. If the widow(er) had no earnings, each family member would receive 62.5 percent of the PIA, which is the family maximum divided by three or $646. Now suppose the widow(er) earns $18,432 in 2001. 15 This is $7,752 above the exempt amount of $10,680 and the widow(er)'s Social Security must be reduced by $3,876 (i.e., $7,752 * 0.5). This is equal to exactly six months worth of Social Security benefi ts, so SSA would not pay the widow(er) his or her $646 benefi t for the fi rst six months of the year. Because the widow(er) does not receive a benefi t, the family maximum does not bind and the children, in those six months, would get their full 75 percent of PIA. So, for the fi rst six months, the family receives 150 percent of the PIA ($1,551 a month). Starting with the seventh month, each family member-including the widow(er)-receives $646 (for a total of $1,938). If the widow(er) had remarried, the family would receive $1,551 for all months, implying that the marriage penalty is zero in the fi rst six months and $387 ($1,938 -$1,551) in the fi nal six months. Note that, in this example, if the widow(er) had earnings greater than $26,184, the earnings test would have prevented payment of widow(er) benefi ts for all months in 2001 and no marriage penalty would exist for that year.
PERCEIVED PENALTIES
Due to the complicated interaction between individual benefi ts and family maximums, it is possible that the actual marriage penalty may differ from what the widow(er) perceives the penalty to be. As a result of administrative procedures instituted by SSA, a widow(er) is likely to know that marriage terminates his or her benefi ts. 16 However, SSA policy does not require any printed or verbal discussion of the effect of remarriage on family benefi ts. Consider, for example, a family composed of a widow(er) and three children whose family maximum is 187.5 percent of PIA. From Social Security's accounting perspective, each individual receives 46.875 percent of PIA. The widow(er)-presumably knowing that his or her benefi t will terminate upon remarriage-may perceive this amount to be the penalty, but recall from the preceding discussion that when three or more children are present the actual penalty is zero. If this widow(er) were to remarry, the family would still receive 187.5 percent of PIA because the widow(er)'s 46.875 percent of PIA would simply be redistributed to the children. We consider this to be the upper bound of the mistaken inference a widow(er) could make and we refer to this incorrect way of calculating the penalty, based on individual rather than family benefi ts, as the perceived monthly marriage penalty.
17 Because a widow(er)'s benefi t is the smaller of 75 percent of PIA or the family maximum divided by the number of family members, this can be written as follows:
Actual penalty and perceived penalties are shown for families with one child, two children, and three children in Figure 3 . The figure illustrates that the distance between the actual penalty and what we call the perceived penalty is greatest for families with three or more children because the widow(er)s receive individual benefi ts while unmarried, yet at all levels of PIA, the family maximum formula results in no actual penalty. In contrast, the family maximum never binds for families with only one child, so there is no distinction between the actual and the perceived penalty.
CALCULATING MARRIAGE PENALTIES IN THE CHILD-IN-CARE PROGRAM
To characterize the size of the marriage penalties faced by actual recipients of the child-in-care program and how these penalties vary by recipient characteristics, we use a weighted ten-percent sample of SSA's administrative records extracted in January 2001 from SSA's benefi t records, earnings records, and SSN application records. To draw our sample, we start with the benefi t records of child-in-care widow(er)s whose Social Security numbers (SSNs) end in the following two digits: 00, 05, 20, 25, 40, 45, 70, 75, 90, or 95 . Each of these widow(er)s is given a weight 16 The SSA publication "What You Need to Know When You Get Retirement or Survivors Benefi ts," which is mailed to widow(er)s upon entitlement, contains a section on marriage that tells child-in-care widow(er)s (and some other benefi ciaries) that "your benefi ts will stop if you get married, except in special circumstances" (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2002). (The special circumstances refer to exceptions in the law that allow these widow(er)s to remarry other Social Security benefi ciaries who receive certain types of benefi ts.) Perhaps more important, SSA, on a regular basis, mails these widow(er)s a form on which they are required to report whether they are now married and whether the children are still under their care. In our view, it is reasonable to conclude that the periodic mailings cause these child-in-care widow(er)s to realize their continued eligibility depends upon being unmarried (as well as having children in their care). SSA administrative policies are described in U.S. Social Security Administration (2003) . 17 The widow(er) will receive an "award" letter from SSA upon entitlement that describes the child-in-care widow(er) benefi t (including the dollar amount of the individual's widow(er) benefi t). This award letter will not describe the effect of remarriage on family benefi ts, which reinforces our view that many widow(er)s perceive penalties based on individual benefi ts. SSA does produce a publication, "Survivors Benefi ts" (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2000) , that discusses the family maximum. This publication is available to the public on SSA's web site.
of ten. 18 In addition to his or her own SSN, the widow(er)'s benefi t record will contain the deceased spouse's SSN, which SSA refers to as the Claim Account Number (CAN) because it is the "account" on which benefi ts are based. With the CAN, it is possible to then fi nd the benefi t records of all persons who receive benefi ts on the deceased worker's account. We assume all the children on the account are being cared for by the widow(er) and together they constitute a unit that shares resources (i.e., a family). 19 We then calculate marriage penalties using equations [3] and [4] where N is the number of children on the account, PIA is the deceased worker's PIA, and FMAX is the family maximum on the account. Like estimates of marriage penalties in other contexts, we stress that these are the penalties that arise from changes in Social Security benefi ts simply due to a change in legal marital status and that we are ignoring all other costs and benefi ts of marriage.
We estimate that, at the start of 2001, there were 239,140 widow(er)s entitled to child-in-care benefi ts from Social Security. Table 1 divides these widow(er)s into three distinct groups: no marriage penalty because of the earnings test (Group A), no marriage penalty because of family maximum provisions (Group B), and a positive marriage penalty (Group C).
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The summary statistics relate these groupings to the sources of marriage penalties in the child-in-care program.
Note that, for 14.5 percent of widow(er)s (that is, Group A in Table 1 ), the earnings test prevents the payment of benefi ts for all months of 2001. These are categorically eligible persons who do not actually receive any widow(er) payments from The last two digits of the SSN can be used to form a random sample (the two digits are not systematically assigned), and such samples are used for SSA publications, such as the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2001a). Our data are not publicly available due to confi dentiality restrictions. 19 In about two percent of the cases, there are two or more adult survivors on a single account (e.g., a widow and a surviving divorced wife). In theses cases, we select one child-in-care survivor at random and assign all children on the account to that survivor. 20 We project 2001 earnings based on actual earnings from 1999. Specifi cally, we assume 2001 earnings will be 11 percent higher than 1999 earnings. Average wages in the U.S. grew by 11 percent from 1997 to 1999 (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2001a, Table 2 .A8). Earnings from 1999 were the most recent available as of January 2001 (the date our data were extracted from SSA's system).
Social Security because they have very high earnings. Therefore, there is no penalty (actual or perceived) for remarriage. We only mention them for purposes of categorizing the widow(er) population -they are not included in our analysis or in other tables (Tables 2 and 3 ).
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For approximately 43,000 widow(er)s (Group B) and their 130,000 children, the widow(er) is receiving benefits, yet family benefits will equal the family maximum regardless of remarriage. Therefore, if they remarried, these payments would simply be redistributed to the children. Thus, members in this group have positive perceived penalties, but face no actual penalties. Recall that zero (actual) penalty cases occur in all large families (three or more children) and in families with two children where the PIA is low. This is consistent with the high average number of children in these families (3.0) and the low average PIA ($772).
Still, the majority of families, 67.4 percent, do face positive actual marriage penalties. Not surprisingly, in these Group C cases the average number of children (1.3) is low and the average PIA ($986) is high.
To get a better sense of the distribution of penalties, we use equations [3] and [4] to calculate actual and perceived penalties for all widow(er)s in Groups B and C.
22 Table 2 shows that 50 percent of widow(er)s face an actual annual penalty of $4,090 or more. Ten percent of widow(er)s face an annual marriage penalty in excess of $10,920 per year. Although we do not know whether these penalties are large relative to total income (because Social Security administrative records do not include comprehensive measures of income), over 40 percent of widow(er)s face an actual penalty equal to 75 percent of the annualized value of their deceased spouses' PIAs. This is presumably a relatively substantial amount given that policymakers believe 75 percent of PIA is enough to help a widow(er) maintain his or her standard of living following a worker's death. Perceived penalties are substantially higher-50 percent of widow(er)s may perceive a penalty of $6,430 or more. And, our upper bound estimate suggests that over 20 percent of widow(er)s may perceive a penalty when in fact one does not exist.
In Table 3 , we present summary statistics for several subgroups of the widowed population. Recently-entitled widow(er)s -those entitled during the year 2000 -have actual and perceived penalties that are somewhat lower than the overall widow(er) group. The mean actual penalty ($4,230) and the median actual penalty ($3,910) are $560 and $180 less than the mean and median of the overall widow(er) group (perceived penalties are also lower). One explanation for this difference is that the entire pool of widow(er)s may disproportionately be persons with high penalties who chose not to remarry precisely because of the penalty. Recently-entitled widow(er)s have not had much time to remarry and may refl ect a less select distribution. Table 3 also investigates penalties facing groups more typically thought to be economically disadvantaged, including young widow(er)s, African Americans, and Hispanics. The results reveal that relatively large percentages of very young widow(er)s, black persons, and Hispanics face no actual penalty because they are characterized by large family sizes and low PIAs. 23 For example, one out of every three young widow(er)s and Hispanic recipients would not incur a penalty upon remarriage.
So far, we have discussed annual income foregone by a child-in-care
Annual Relative Amounts Annual Dollar Amounts widow(er) who remarries. In fact, remarriage may result in the widow(er) forgoing the child-in-care payments for a number of years and we refer to the entire stream of foregone payment as the "lifetime penalty." Table 3 sheds light on the potential lifetime penalties faced by childin-care widow(er)s. Except for the relatively small number of widow(er)s caring for disabled children, the lifetime penalty depends crucially on the age of the youngest child because widow(er) benefits (and any associated marriage penalty) terminate when that child reaches age 16. The next to the last row in Table 3 provides mean age of youngest child for widow(er)s and for various subgroups. The mean age is 12.8 in the overall group, 9.7 in the recently entitled group, and 10.8 in the group where a minor child is present. This last group is the most relevant because it excludes the small number of families where widow(er) entitlement is the result of caring for a disabled child. Based on these results, the annual penalties documented in Tables 2 and 3 may typically last about fi ve years. The present value of lifetime penalties also depends on age-specific mortality probabilities for the widow(er). The last row of Table 3 suggests that this issue may not be of great importance because these widow(er)s are an average of 42.9 years old, and their mortality probabilities are therefore low.
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COMPARISONS TO THE INCOME TAX AND WELFARE LITERATURES
The child-in-care widow(er) population is not represented in large numbers in survey data, and SSA's large administrative data fi les do not contain enough information to formally model the remarriage decision. 25 However, it is possible to assess whether the marriage penalties in the child-in-care program are large enough to affect marriage decisions. To do so, we rely on two other literatures that measure the size of marriage penalties in government programs and their effects on behavior.
First, the literature on marriage penalties in the income tax system has a long history of estimating the size of marriage penalties. For example, the Department of Treasury estimates that 48 percent of couples incurred a marriage penalty, with an average value in 1999 of $1,141 (Bull et al., 1999). 26 This is well below the average actual and perceived penalties ($4,790 and $6,560) for all 2001 child-in-care widow(er)s that are reported in Table 3 , yet studies have found that tax laws have small but statistically signifi cant effects on marital decisions. For example, use individual longitudinal data and fi nd a negative relationship between penalties and the probability of marriage. At the mean value of the variables, a ten percent increase in the marriage penalty lowered the probability of marriage by 2.3 percent; much higher elasticities were found at maximum 24 The present value of lifetime penalties depends on a number of factors other than age of the youngest child and the age of the widow(er)-such as the discount rate-but statistics in Table 3 should offer a sense of how long the annual penalties may typically last. 25 Although SSA administrative data have information on whether a benefi t was terminated due to remarriage, there is no information on prospective or actual spouses. In addition, the information on the widow(er) is generally limited to data needed to administer the Social Security program. For example, even basic information, such as the widow(er)'s education, is not available. 26 In related work, the Congressional Budget Offi ce estimates that 42 percent of married couples in 1996 faced a tax penalty, which had an average annual value of $1,380 (Congressional Budget Offi ce, 1997). Alm and Whittington (1996a) found that the average penalty rose from about $350 in 1967 to a peak of $1,900 in 1981. By 1994, Alm and Whittington (1996a) estimate that the average penalty was $1,200, which is similar to results found by Eissa and Hoynes (2000) and Feenberg and Rosen (1995) . levels of tax penalties. On another margin, Sjoquist and Walker (1995) , Gelardi (1996) , and Alm and Whittington (1996b) found that couples timed their marriages to avoid paying a tax penalty for one year. Traditional welfare programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) historically targeted single parents, a population more similar to the population of child-in-care widows than the population of taxpayers. Like the child-in-care program, AFDC benefi ts generally terminated upon legal marriage. Unlike the income tax literature, there are few estimates of the distribution of marriage penalties in this system. One exception is Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998), who provide estimates that poor women with children under 18 face average marriage penalties of approximately $3,800 from the AFDC and food stamp programs in 1990. 27 Relative to the income tax literature, this is closer in magnitude to our estimates of the child-in-care marriage penalties. In a recent survey of the behavioral effects of these programs, Moffi tt (1998) concludes that most studies fi nd a negative correlation between generous welfare benefi ts and marriage.
We approach comparisons to these literatures with caution because the broad population affected by the income tax system is so different to the child-in-care widow(er)s and the route into single-parenthood for most welfare recipients (out-of-wedlock childbearing and divorce) may imply differential responses to marriage incentives, relative to widowed persons. Despite these caveats, however, the fi ndings in the income tax and welfare literatures suggest the Social Security marriage penalties probably discourage some marriages or encourage some couples to postpone marriage while the widow(er) is eligible for benefi ts.
COSTS OF REMOVING THE MARRIAGE TERMINATION PROVISION
In this section, we consider the cost of removing the termination provision. To provide policymakers with a range of options, we evaluate three possible changes: (1) repealing the termination provision completely (and allowing widow(er)s with previously-terminated benefi ts to re-establish entitlement), (2) repealing the provision prospectively for all new marriages, and (3) repealing the provision prospectively for all new benefi ciaries. Note that, in general, the cost of repealing the termination provision is invariant to the repeal's effect on marriage decisions. A widow(er) who would remarry only if the termination provision were removed is a person who will always be a benefi ciary and always impose costs on Social Security (that is, if the termination provision remains in place such a person would not remarry and collect benefi ts, and if the termination provision were removed such a person would remarry and collect benefi ts). The cost depends on widow(er)s who will remarry even in the face of a termination provision. We can observe such widow(er)s in the Social Security Administration's data.
First, we consider a complete repeal of the termination provision beginning in 2003. 28 Under this policy, widow(er)s 27 The work by Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998) is relevant to the child-in-care population for another reason. Their work focused on the ability of the income tax system to partially offset the large marriage penalties in the welfare system. Like the welfare population in their work, child-in-care widow(er)s without substantial earnings are likely to face large subsidies for marriage in the income tax system that may partially offset the marriage penalties in the child-in-care program. 28 Technically, Social Security rules require a survivor to be unmarried at initial entitlement and that benefi ts terminate upon remarriage. In cases where the worker was divorced prior to his or her death, the ex-spouse may not initially be eligible for benefi ts because the ex-spouse may have remarried prior to the worker's death. This feature of the law would not be changed. In essence, when we speak of repealing the termination provision, we mean that marriages that occur after the worker's death would not prevent entitlement to child-in-care benefi ts. Alternatively, policymakers in favor of removing the marriage termination provision might prefer to remove it prospectively. One approach would be to no longer apply the termination provision for marriages that occur after enactment of legislation. Such an approach would lower near-term costs substantially because widow(er)s with terminated benefi ts would not have their eligibility restored. A prospective repeal would still potentially leverage a large behavioral effect because currently-entitled widow(er)s would be free to marry after enactment. Thus, this option-like the fi rst option-would remove all $979 million of aggregate marriage penalties. Again, any behavioral effect does not affect our cost estimate-widow(er)s who would remarry because of a repeal are persons who will be on the rolls regardless of whether a termination provision exists. We estimate that a prospective repeal for all marriages contracted in 2003 and later would have a fi ve-year cost of $318 million, or about 30 percent of the fi ve-year cost of complete repeal.
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The costs for individual years over the 29 Some caveats about the cost estimates should be made. We take earnings as fi xed. Persons who become re-entitled to child-in-care widow(er) benefi ts might alter their labor supply. Also, actual costs to the government could be lower because we ignore the additional federal revenue due to the taxation of Social Security benefi ts. On the other hand, costs presented here may be understated because some widow(er)s who would be eligible for benefi ts under the proposal are not in SSA's record system. Specifi cally, a widow(er) with very high earnings may not bother to claim benefi ts initially because the earnings test would prevent payment of any benefi ts. Later, he or she may remarry and, possibly, stop working. Such a widow(er) would be eligible under the proposal but would not be observed in SSA's historical records and, therefore, not refl ected in our cost estimates. 30 Taxable payroll consists of total earnings subject to Social Security taxes. Taxable payroll is expected to be $4.537 trillion in 2003 (U.S. Congress, 2002b, p. 169) . Aggregate marriage penalties can be derived from Table  3 by multiplying the average penalty ($4,790) by the number of widow(er)s (204, 380 Such a repeal would not affect the existing $979 million in marriage penalties because current benefi ciaries would be unable to take advantage of it.
All of the options considered thus far would be expansions of the Social Security program; some policymakers might argue that policy options should reduce marriage penalties and, at the same time, hold program expenditures constant. For example, if child-in-care widow(er) benefi ts were eliminated and the benefi t rate paid to child benefi ciaries were increased, it might be possible to hold total program expenditures constant.
33 Total payments to surviving families would be unchanged but, with no widow(er) benefit, there would be no marriage penalty. For remarried widow(er)s, this type of option has no effect on widow(er) benefits-they are not payable under current law and would not be available under an option that eliminated widow(er) benefi ts-but would increase family benefi ts because their children (like all children) would get a special supplement funded by the elimination of widow(er) benefi ts. Thus, this type of option implicitly redistributes Social Security benefi ts to families where the widow(er) remarries. Some policymakers might object on the grounds that remarried widow(er)s already have access to greater family income (through their spouses); this illustrates, again, the trade-offs policymakers face over adequacy of benefi ts, program incentives, and program expenditures.
ADMINISTRATIVE OPTIONS
In the recent debate over the reauthorization of the TANF program, the Bush Administration argued that the government has a role in disseminating information on the effects of marriage. Arguing that marriage lowers poverty, improves the well-being of children, and fosters communities with fewer social problems, the Bush Administration has advocated using some TANF funds to promote marriage, including public education campaigns that cite the benefits of "healthy marriages." 34 The idea that more information might promote marriage has been offered data--in 1999, 49 percent of terminated widow(er) benefi ts were from marriages contracted in the last fi ve years. Prospective repeal could cause some "gaming" of the legislative proposal, where remarried widow(er)s choose to divorce and then remarry the same person after the legislation takes effect. This type of gaming, which is not incorporated into these estimates, has some limitations (for example, many states require couples to live apart for a period of time before a divorce is granted 33 We do not specify a particular option of this type. The basic idea is that if child-in-care widow(er) benefi ts were eliminated, the government could use the savings to increase the benefi t rate of child benefi ciaries above 75 percent of PIA, expand the family maximum, or use some other mechanism to increase child benefi ts. 34 See comments by Wade F. Horn, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families in the Department of Health and Human Services (Horn, 2002). in the past. Waite (1995) argued that social scientists had an obligation to provide the public with information on the benefi ts of marriage much in the same way medical researchers provided information on the benefi ts of exercise or the hazards of smoking. Although some persons have criticized using TANF funds to promote marriage, 35 the idea of the government as a conveyor of information is a promising one in the case of the child-in-care program. For reasons discussed earlier, it is plausible that many widow(er)s perceive higher penalties than actually exist. By providing accurate information to benefi ciaries, SSA might increase the likelihood of marriage simply because benefi ciaries would realize the penalties are not as severe as they seem. One mechanism for informing benefi ciaries is the annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) notice issued by SSA. Language could be added to these notices to inform child-in-care beneficiaries that, while remarriage terminates the widow(er)'s benefi t, it may not reduce total benefi ts paid to the family. Individuals wanting detailed information about how marriage affects their family benefi ts would be instructed to contact SSA. This is just one of many low-cost methods for disseminating information about the effect of marriage on family benefi ts.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several important fi ndings presented in this paper. Although the marriage termination provision in Social Security's child-in-care program helps ensure a well-targeted program, it does produce sizeable marriage penalties. These marriage penalties are much larger than those that have been documented in the U.S. tax code and, because of their size, likely do affect marriage decisions. For example, 50 percent of widow(er)s face an annual penalty of $4,090 or more and ten percent face an annual marriage penalty in excess of $10,920 per year. Because of family size and PIA, minorities and young widows tend to face relatively smaller penalties, although the mean penalty still exceeds $3,300 per year for these groups.
We estimate that complete repeal of the termination provision would increase program expenditures by a relatively modest amount of $222 million in 2003. Prospective repeal would cost even less and, depending on the type of prospective repeal, might leverage a large behavioral effect because current benefi ciaries would be free to marry.
It is likely that widow(er)s perceive larger penalties than actually exist. This may especially be true for some groups of economically-vulnerable widow(er)s (those with large families and those from minority groups). We outlined some simple steps that the SSA could take to let widow(er)s know that penalties are less severe than they seem. This practical approach to policy has some advantages: it is low cost and may promote marriage.
The results in this paper raise a number of additional questions and suggest some important avenues for future research. For example, the penalties are quite large, and yet some widow(er)s do remarry. One direction for future research would be to use the marriage termination provision to derive explicit estimates of the value of marriage. Also, given the size of the penalties and behavioral results from other literatures, it is likely that the termination provision affects decisions about whether or when to marry. The welfare 35 See Heidi Hartmann's response to Assistant Secretary Horn (Hartmann, 2002) . 36 SSA produces a number of publications that are distributed in fi eld offi ces and via the Internet. A new publication could be produced that contains a discussion of the family maximum and how family benefi ts change upon remarriage. In addition to being available in fi eld offi ces and on the Internet, such a publication could be included along with the "award" letters that are mailed to newly-entitled benefi ciaries.
implications in the case where marriages are postponed to avoid the marriage penalty are serious because postponing marriage while children are in the household may affect the children's well-being. However, there may be greater concern if widow(er)s never remarry, which has implications for the children's well-being and for the widow(er)'s well-being later in life. Measuring the effect of the termination provision is diffi cult because child-in-care widow(er)s are not typically represented in large numbers in surveys. However, future research may be able to combine these widow(er)s with other groups (that face marriage subsidies or penalties) in a general model that relates financial incentives to marriage decisions.
